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Dirck: Federal Reserved Rights and the Interstate Allocation of Water

COMMENTS
FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS AND THE
INTERSTATE ALLOCATION OF WATER*
I. INTRODUCTION

The existence of federal reserved water rights has been
recognized since 1908 when Winters v. United States' was decided, but an appreciation of the multiplicity and magnitude
of these rights is of more recent origin and concern. Likewise,
interstate allocation problems have surfaced from time-totime, but the frequency and seriousness of these allocation
problems is certain to increase as water development accelerates. Each of these concepts has been widely studied and
written on individually, but the relationship between the two
has not been extensively examined.
This Comment investigates the relationship between federal reserved rights and the interstate allocation of water. The
basic question is, "How can the burden of federal reserved
rights be allocated among the several states of an interstate
river basin?" In some instances, the particular interstate compact will provide for certain reserved rights to be charged
against a particular state's allocation; in others, the interstate
compact is silent about the allocation of water for federal reserved rights. Even if the compact does address the manner
in which federal reserved rights are to be satisfied, the compact may have been formed long before the nature and extent of the reserved rights were understood. Similarly, apportionment decrees may or may not address the satisfaction of
reserved water rights. Of course, if a river basin is subject
neither to an apportionment decree nor a compact, there is
nothing which speaks to the issue of which states are to bear
the burden created by the federal reserved water rights.
In examining the relationship between federal reserved
rights and interstate allocation of water and how the burden
is to be allocated, additional questions are raised. These include: By approving an interstate compact, has Congress limited or compromised in any way the reserved rights the UnitCopyright C 1978 by the University of Wyoming.
*This Comment was funded in part by a grant from the Office of Water Research
and Technology, U.S. Department of the Interior, under Public Law 88-379, the
Water Resources Research Act of 1964, acting through the Wyoming Water Resource Research Institute.
1. 207 U.S. 564 (1909T
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ed states would otherwise have had? When a compact speaks
to the issue of reserved rights, to what extent is the compact
applicable to claims which were not apparent at the time it
was entered into? If water rights junior to a reserved right
must be eliminated to satisfy the reserved rights-and these
junior water rights are located in several states, how will the
uses to be terminated be determined? How should future
compacts deal with the problem of reserved water rights and
the allocation of this burden among the compacting states?
The legal underpinnings of reserved rights and interstate
allocation will be scrutinized in an effort to discuss these issues and to delineate how the problems of interstate allocation and reserved water rights interact. Special attention will
be given to Indian reserved rights because these are likely to
require large amounts of water and to cause significant interstate water problems.
II. BACKGROUND OF RESERVED RIGHTS
AND INTERSTATE ALLOCATION

A brief discussion of the legal problems and concepts underlying federal reserved rights and interstate allocation of
water is helpful to a complete understanding of an examination of the relationship between the two.
A. FederalReserved Water Rights
The beginning of the federal reserved rights doctrine can
be traced to United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation
Company.2 The Supreme Court in Rio Grande allowed the
United States to take water for federal lands without compensating those from whom the water was taken. 3 The federal reserved rights doctrine was first applied in Winters v.
United States.4
Winters arose from a dispute between the Indians on the
Fort Belknap Reservation and the non-Indian appropriators
of waters of the Milk River. The Fort Belknap Indian Reser2. 174 U.S. (1899).
3. Id. at 703: "First ... in the absence of specific authority from Congress a State
cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of
lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as
may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property."
4. Winters v. United States, supra note 1.
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vation had been established by treaty in 1888. After the treaty,
but before the Indians had initiated appropriations from the
Milk River, non-Indians settled upstream from the reservation
lands and began diverting and applying the waters of the Milk
River to beneficial use. The United States Supreme Court
construed the treaty with the Indian tribe, which was silent
on the subject of water, and held the reservation of land carried an implicit reservation, in favor of the Indians, of the
right to take sufficient water from the Milk River to fulfill
the purposes of the reservation of land. 5 The priority date of
the Indians' water right was the date of the reservation's creation. Accordingly, the Indians had an earlier priority date and
a superior water right in relation to non-Indian water users
who had been making beneficial use of the water.
For many years, the reserved rights doctrine was thought
to be unique to Indian reservations; however, in FederalPower Commission v. Oregon,6 the Supreme Court hinted reserved
rights attached to other federal reservations as well. In Arizona
v. California,7 a case dealing with the dispute between California, Nevada and Arizona over the proper allocation of the
Colorado River, the Supreme Court found reserved rights to
attach not only to Indian lands but also to federal reservations
such as national parks, forests and wildlife refuges. Recently,
the reserved rights doctrine was applied to groundwater. 8
The present attitude toward reserved rights can be seen
by reference to legal writings and the court decisions rendered
subsequent to Arizona v. California. A majority of the commentators have been critical of the reservation doctrine and
have urged its restriction. 9 However, one commentator, William H. Veeder, very forcefully represents the opposing view
in the context of Indian reserved rights.1 0 Mr. Veeder espouses
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1472 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines "reservation" as a
tract of land that has been withdrawn from the operation of the public land laws
(sale or settlement) by public authority and is appropriated to specific public uses
such as parks, Indian lands, etc.

6.
7.

349 U.S. 435 (1955).
373 U.S. 546 (1963).

Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
See Bloom, Indian "Paramount" Rights to Water Use, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 669 (1971); Trelease, Water Resources on the Public Lands: PLLRC's Solution to the Reservation Doctrine, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 89 (1970); HiUhouse,
The Public Land Law Review Commission Report: Icebreaking in Reserved Waters?, 4 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 368 (1971).
See
Veeder, Indian Prior and ParamountRights to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY
10.
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 631 (1971); Indian Priorand Paramount Rights Versus State
Rights, 51 N.D. L. REV. 107 (1974).
8.
9.
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Indian "prior and paramount rights stem[ming] from the
fact that title to those rights [has] always resided in the
American Indians, [and there] are no interests which could
be prior in time or right."" Mr. Veeder takes an almost militant position in asserting Indian rights to water and the need
to protect them from infringement by non-Indians and states.
He also notes, with criticism, the failure of the United States
to prevent violations of 'Indian rights. 12
The courts have continued to recognize the validity of
reserved rights, but have been somewhat sympathetic to stateinitiated water right holders and have sought to protect their
rights by a broad interpretation of the McCarran Amendment. 13 The Court, in United States v. District Court in and
for the County of Eagle, 14 addressed the adjudication and
quantification of federal reserved rights under the McCarran
Amendment. The Eagle County Court determined the state
courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate and quantify federal reserved rights as well as federal rights initiated under state law
under the "otherwise" language of the Amendment. 5
Eagle County spoke of Indian and non-Indian water rights
without distinction. 6 Colorado River Water Conservancy
District v. United States17 clarified matters by finding Indian
rights to be in the same category as other federal reserved
rights and under the "otherwise" language of the Amendment, 8 so they, too, could be adjudicated and quantified in a
state court proceeding.
11.

Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of Water, supra note 10, at

649.
12.

Veeder, Indian Priorand Paramount Rights Versus State Rights, supra note 10, at

135.
13. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). Congress aided the states in their quest to add security and
definiteness to water rights in the West by enacting the McCarran Amendment.
This enactment allows a state to quantify not only the United State's state-initiated
water rights, but also the federal reserved water rights. This comprehensive adjudication power is consistent with the purpose of the Amendment-to reduce uncertainty about rights by allowing quantification of all rights in a stream, not just state
rights.
The McCarran Amendment provides: "Consent is given to join the United
States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of wa-

ter of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such right,
where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of ac-

quiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange,
or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

States . ..shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having
jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances."
401 U.S. 520 (1971).
Id. at 524.
Id.
424 U.S. 800 (1976).
Id. at 810.
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Reserved water rights have several characteristics which
set them apart from state-initiated water rights. The priority
date of the reserved water right is the date of the land reservation rather than the date the water is applied to a beneficial
use. A reserved water right is not subject to state laws regulating appropriations and use of water (diversion, permits, beneficial use). Unlike other water rights, which must be applied
to beneficial use or be lost after a statutorily designated period, a reserved water right endures even if it is not exercised.
A reserved water right is for the amount of water necessary
to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, including future as
well as present needs.' 9 The reserved right may be for a quantified amount but usually is not.
From these characteristics stem many of the criticisms of
the doctrine-the most common of which are the indefiniteness of amount required to satisfy the reserved rights and the
uncertainty the reserved rights create. This uncertainty relates
to the unknown time when previously dormant reserved rights
will be asserted to the detriment of state water users. 20 Dean
Trelease has summarized the criticisms of federal reserved
rights as follows:
19. Arizona v. California, supra note 7, at 601.
20. Indian and federal reserved rights could require vast amounts of water because they
are implied to be of a sufficient amount to satisfy the purposes for which the land
was reserved. To date, there has been no uniform agreement on the method to be
used to quantify these rights. In addition, the uncertainty created by reserved
rights hinders the development of waters which might be subject to reserved rights.
Potential water users do not know what quantity of water at what priority date is
available for new projects and uses and are reluctant to make investments under
these conditions.
In Arizona v. California, supra note 7, at 601, the Supreme Court directly addressed the allocation of Indian water rights in making its decree. The Court found
"[A] l uses of mainstream water within a State are to be charged against that
State's apportionment, which of course includes uses by the United States." Admirably, the Court not only determined which states were to bear the burden of
reserved rights, but also quantified the Indian reserved rights. The Court followed
the Master's conclusion that the amount of water the Indians were entitled to was
an amount to satisfy future as well as the present needs. The amount reserved at
the date of the creation of the reservation was found to be enough water to irrigate
all "practicably irrigable acreages" on the reservation. Id. at 596. This standard of
"practicably irrigable acreage" is a precedent for quantifying the amount of water
reserved for Indian reservations in the future.
It is interesting to note the concern for the water rights of junior appropriators
expressed in the Master's Report in Arizona v. California. SPECIAL MASTER'S REPORT, Arizona v. California 254-66 (1960) [hereinafter referred to as SPECIAL
MASTER'S REPORT]. The Master's Report evidences an intent to prevent uncertainty and to assist water development in the Lower Basin States by quantifying
Indian reserved rights that had previously kept non-Indian users in doubt as to
what and how much water was available for their use. Id. at 256. The Master preferred to quantify the water reserved to the Indians by use of the "practicably irrigable acreage" standard rather than an open-ended decree because the limitless
claim of being legally entitled to take any water they wanted whenever needed
would jeopardize the junior water rights. By establishing the magnitude and prior-
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Rights created by the reservation doctrine . .. are
wild cards that may be played at anytime, blank
checks that may be filled in for any amount, or that
may never be cashed. They deter other uses, and cause
losses of benefits, and they encourage or permit federal uses that are financially possible with the money
undesirable because more is
at hand but economically
21
lost than gained.
The reserved rights doctrine can be justified, at least partially, as an exercise of federal power over land and water. It
has also been explained by one authority as being a financial
doctrine. 22 The reserved rights doctrine has the effect of allowing the federal government to take water without compensating junior water users who have been relying upon and
applying it to beneficial use. The water needed for the federal
reservation can be taken without compensation because the
government's federal reserved right is prior in time, therefore,
23
superior in right.
Notwithstanding the dissatisfaction with and criticisms of
the reserved rights doctrine, it seems to be here to stay. This
is evidenced by the reluctance of the United States to surrender any rights acquired under the reserved rights doctrine.
Furthermore, the United States continues to seek to limit the
states' powers over water and to increase its own.
ity of the Indian rights, some degree of certainty was established for the United
States, Indians and non-Indians. Id. at 261-66.
The cases concerning Indian water rights have dealt with Indian reserved rights
for irrigation. Another area of uncertainty exists because non-irrigation claims have
never received judicial approval or disapproval. The Master held the measurement
of the amount of water reserved was to be "determined by agricultural and related
requirements, since when the water was reserved that was the purpose of the reservations." Id. at 265. The Master also stated, "This does not necessarily mean, however, that water reserved for Indian Reservations may not be used for purposes
other than agricultural and related uses. The question of change in the character of
use is not before me." Id. While the Master does not say there can be no non-irrigation uses, the measuring standard is the agriculturaluse if that was the purpose for
which the reservation was created--measuring at the point in time of creation.
Courts have not yet been directly confronted with the question of whether
Indian water rights can be transferred from one use or purpose to another. The answer to this issue would make a great deal of difference in the amount of water
that would actually be applied as opposed to that which Indians may have a right
to, yet do not exercise.
If a change in the character of the use (after quantification based on agricultural and related uses) is allowed, the water could be applied to new, more beneficial uses. By allowing a change, however, state water users are exposed to a greater risk of harm, i.e., water not being available for their use. A change in use could
possibly be limited by the concept which allows a change in use only if no unreasonable harm is inflicted upon junior water users. Even this concept may not be applicable since federal water rights are not subject to state water laws.
21. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 160 (1971).
22. Id.
23. Hillhouse, supra note 9, at 370.
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A case pending in a Wyoming District Court, In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River System and All Other Sources,24 explicitly demonstrates
the inclination of the government to resist any growth of
state control over water. In this case, the State filed suit and
served notice of an action to adjudicate rights to over twenty
thousand water users-including the United States. The United States sought to remove the suit to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. In response, the State
filed a motion to remand the suit to the state district court,
and the motion was granted. The United States then filed a
motion to dismiss in the state court and the motion was denied. In both the federal and state courts, the United States
presented the same argument, i.e., the action was not a suit
or a general adjudication as required by the McCarran Amendment, therefore, the state court could not hear the action.
This repeated use of technical defenses in an attempt to avoid
an adjudication of federal water rights demonstrates the uncooperative attitude of the government in this area.
B. Interstate Allocation
The division of the waters of a river or stream that flows
between and through two or more states has been accomplished in three ways: equitable apportionment by the courts,
congressional apportionment and interstate compacts between
states. A brief discussion of each follows.
Equitable Apportionment. Equitable apportionment was
first espoused by the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Colorado.5
The case involved a dispute over the division of the flow and
benefits of the Arkansas River. Kansas, a riparian water law
state, claimed the water by virtue of the fact the water flowed
through the state. Colorado, a prior appropriation state, based
its claim on its making beneficial use of the water at a point
in time prior to those uses in Kansas. The Court did not actually divide the water between the two states because it
found Kansas had suffered no harm, but indicated if it had
done so, it would have applied equitable principles and given
each state a just and reasonable share of the flow.
24. Dist. Ct. Civ. Action 4993 (5th Jud. Dist. 1977).
25. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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The Supreme Court actually applied the equitable apportionment doctrine to an interstate stream for the first time in
Wyoming v. Colorado.26 In Wyoming v. Colorado the Court
resolved the dispute between the two states over the waters
of the Laramie River by allocating to each state a just and
reasonable share of the benefits of the stream's flow.
In applying the equitable apportionment doctrine, the
Court generally attempts to protect existing rights in each
state and to allocate the benefits as to the needs of each state.
Each state is to receive a just and equitable share of the flow
of the interstate stream although it may be difficult to determine what that share is. There are no real standards in
equitable apportionment-only "relevant" factors that are
considered by courts in dividing the interstate stream."
Congressional Apportionment. Congressional apportionment is the allocation of the flow of an interstate stream by
means of congressional enactment. Prior to Arizona v. California,2 8 this method of division of interstate waters was not
known to exist, and it is likely that Congress was not aware it
was "apportioning" the Colorado River when it enacted the
Boulder Canyon Project Act.2 However, the Supreme Court
in Arizona v. California found Congress had created its own
comprehensive scheme of apportioning the waters of the Colorado River by the terms of the Act. The decision may have
been the Court's way of resolving a forty-year old dispute so
development could progress in the Lower Basin States of the
Colorado River.3
Interstate Compacts. Interstate compacts provide for the
distribution and use of the waters of streams and rivers that
flow across state lines and allow states to resolve common
problems on a cooperative basis. In the past, Congress has encouraged states to resolve their water problems in this man26. 259 U.S. 419i (1922).
27. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589,618 (1945), it is stated:
(P] hysical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the
several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the
extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical
effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream
areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is
imposed on the former. . . . [These] are merely an illustrative, not an
exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.
28. Arizona v. California, supra note 7.
29. 45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
30. The Lower Basin States are Arizona, California and Nevada.
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ner by readily granting the constitutionally required consent.
Interstate compacts attempt to accomplish an equitable apportionment of the interstate streams so the system can be
developed without continuing controversy among the states
31
over their relative rights in a common stream.
After the Supreme Court expressed its approval of the
equitable apportionment of the waters of the Laramie River
in Wyoming v. Colorado,a2 western states began to realize
they must agree among themselves as to the division of the
water and benefits on interstate streams to preclude the courts
doing it for them. One fear was that the faster growing Lower
Basin States (California in particular) would receive a proportionately greater share of the water if the Court apportioned
the streams. This fear was grounded on the fact that prior appropriation had been the overriding principle in the equitable
apportionment decrees given by the Supreme Court."
An interstate compact can apportion the water of a stream
or river in various ways. For example, the Colorado River
Compact 34 specifies the quantity of water to be received by
the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins in terms of acre
feet per year of beneficial consumptive use and restricts the
Upper Basin from depleting the flow below a certain amount
at a designated point on the river.1 Other compacts apportion
the stream flow in terms of specified diversion rights measured
in fixed percentages of available flow.M Still other compacts
use combinations of the above.37
When the waters of most interstate streams were allocated, whether by equitable apportionment, congressional apportionment or interstate compact, little attention was given
to the Indian or federal reserved rights to water. Consequently, uncertainty has been infused into each water right initiated
after the creation of an Indian or other federal reservation.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT AND FEDERAL INTERSTATE COMPACT 9 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS].
Wyoming v. Colorado, supra note 26.
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS, supra note 31, at 17.

45 Stat. 1057, 1064 (1928).
Colorado River Compact, art. III(a), (d), 45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
Bear River Compact, art. IV, 72 Stat. 38, 41 (1958); Yellowstone River Compact,
art. V, 65 Stat. 663, 666 (1951); Snake River Compact, art. III, 64 Stat. 29, 30
(1950).
Amended Costilla Creek Compact, art. III and IV, 77 Stat. 350, 353 (1963); Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact, art. III, 63 Stat. 31, 33 (1949).
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These reserved rights bring into question the real effectiveness of the apportionment decrees, statutes and compacts.
Of all reserved rights, Indian water rights pose the greatest
threat to western water users and impair the effectiveness of
interstate allocation of water. Approximately one-half of the
compacts provide that Indian rights are to be charged against
the allocation of the state in which the water is used.3 The
quantity of water belonging to the Indians under these compacts is not specified although these rights potentially demand
the greatest quantity of water from an interstate stream and
would have an early priority date.
III. RESERVED RIGHTS UNDER INTERSTATE ALLOCATION
A brief survey of equitable apportionment, congressional
apportionment and interstate compacts evidences the common treatment of reserved water rights under each of these
types of allocation.
Equitable Apportionment: When the Supreme Court apportioned the Laramie River in Wyoming v. Colorado,3 it did
not consider or discuss how reserved rights were to be satisfied. Although the Court in Nebraska v. Wyoming 40 did not
explicitedly state the reserved rights of the United States
should be charged against the allocation of the state in which
the water was used, this seems to be the result of the case.
This conclusion follows from the Court's refusal to allow the
United States a separate allocation from the North Platte River because the rights of the government were effectively represented by Wyoming's claims.41
Congressional Apportionment: Arizona v. Californian is
the only case to have dealt with congressional apportionment.
In that case, the Boulder Canyon Project Act 43 was interpreted by the Supreme Court to be an enactment by Congress for
the purpose of allocating the Colorado River between the
38. Arizona v. California, supra note 7, reached the same result by apportionment decree.
39. Wyoming v. Colorado, supra note 26.
40. Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra note 27.
41. Id. at 629. The case cannot be distinguished on the basis that the United States'
rights in question had been initiated pursuant to state law because the court expressly stated it made no difference in result whether the rights of the United
tates were initiated under state law or were gained by federal reservation. Id. at
612.
42. Arizona v. California, supra note 7.
43. 45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
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Lower Basin States. The reserved rights for Indians and other
federal reservation purposes were interpreted by the Court as
being "presently perfected rights" under Section 617p of the
Act" and, therefore, entitled to priority. 45 The Court stated
the Indian water rights to be satisfied from the Colorado River were to be charged against the allocation made to each
state under the Act. The Court also found the United States
had reserved sufficient water from the Colorado River to satisfy the needs of other federal reservations, refuges, and recreation areas and was therefore entitled to have those claims rec46
ognized as against a state's claim for water.
Interstate Compacts: There are a number of interstate
compacts dealing with water distribution of interstate streams,
the majority of which deal with rivers located in the western
part of the United States. Approximately one-half of the
compacts expressly provide the allocations are to include all
federal uses made within that state.4 7 The typical compact
provision providing for federal rights within the state to be
charged against that state's allocation is:
The consumptive use of water by the United States of
America or any of its agencies, instrumentalities or
wards shall be charged as a use by the State in which
the use is made; provided, that such consumptive use
incident to the diversion, impounding, or conveyance
of water in one State for 48use in another shall be
charged to such latter State.
Most compacts also provide they are to have no effect on
federal rights, jurisdiction or powers. 49 This provision is commonly included in a compact as a precaution so the compact
44.
45.
46.
47.

43 U.S.C. § 617p (1970).
Arizona v. California, supra note 7, at 598-600.
Id. at 601.
Arkansas River Basin Compact, art. VII, 80 Stat. 1409, 1411 (1966); Klamath
River Basin Compact, art. XHI, 71 Stat. 497, 506 (1957); Yellowstone River Com-

pact, art. VII, 65 Stat. 663, 668 (1951); Snake River Compact, art. XIV, 64 Stat.
9, 34 (1950); Pecos River Compact, art. XII, 63 Stat. 159, 165 (1949); Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact, art. VII, 63 Stat. 31, 35 (1949); Belle Fourche Riv-

er Compact, art. XIV, 58 Stat. 94, 98 (1944); Republican River Compact, art. XI,
57 Stat. 86, 90 (1943).
48. This clause was taken from Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. VII, 63 Stat.
31, 35 (1949), but most other compacts contain a similar or identical provision.
49.

See Klamath River Basin Compact, art. XI, 71 Stat. 497, 505 (1957); Yellowstone

River Compact, art. XVI, 65 Stat. 663, 670 (1951); Snake River Compact, art.
XIV, 64 Stat. 29, 34 (1950); Pecos River Compact, art. XI, 63 Stat. 159, 164
(1949); Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. XIX, 63 Stat. 31, 42 (1949);
Belle Fourche River Compact, art. XHI, 58 Stat. 94, 98 (1944); Republican River
Compact, art. X, 57 Stat. 86, 90 (1943).
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will not be interpreted to impliedly limit federal rights that
conflict with the compact provisions.w
Most interstate compacts were entered into prior 5' to the
rendering of the Pelton Dame and Arizona v. Californias decisions. Thus Indian water rights were known to exist when
most compacts were entered into, but they were not dealt
with in as comprehensive a manner as they might otherwise
have been if the full extent of these rights had been known.
However, the more extensive federal rights had not yet been
acknowledged by the courts when most compacts were
formed and were not dealt with at all. The compacts formed
prior to 19635 had no conception as to the possible expansion of reserved rights. It was not within the states' contemplation that reserved rights might infringe upon their individual shares of water received under an interstate allocation. If
so, the states might have made a different division of water
between the states or might have made specific provision for
sharing the burden of reserved rights.
IV. PROBLEMS FROM THE STATES' VIEWPOINT
A compact is a contract between the pasrty states. Drawing
upon contract law, only those reserved rights in existence or
reasonably foreseeable should be allowed to reduce the
amount of water available to a state under its compact allocation. On the other hand, in order to prevent conflicts over
rights in interstate streams, it would seem best to strictly construe the compact and charge whatever federal uses that may
surface at any time against the allocation of the state in which
the water is used. Support for this position can be found in
the compact clauses which provide no rights of the United
States are to be impaired by the compact. 55 A counter-argument can be made that charging the uncontemplated federal
50.

INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS, supra note 31, at 224.

The exceptions to this statement are: Upper Niobrara Basin Compact, 83 Stat. 86
(1969); Arkansas River Basin Compact, 80 Stat. 1409 (1966); Amended Costilla
Creek Compact, 77 Stat. 350 (1963); Klamath River Basin Compact, 71 Stat. 497
(1957); Bear Creek Compact, 72 Stat. 38 (1958).
52. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, supra note 6.
53. Arizona v. California, supra note 7.
54. Id.
55. For example, Yellowstone River Compact, art. XVI, 65 Stat. 663, 670 (1951), provides:

51.

Nothing in this Compact shall be deemed:

(a) To impair or affect the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the United
States of America in or over the area of waters affected by such com-
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rights that surface in the future against just one state does
not further the purposes of compacts because the state is deprived of its bargain, disputes are not prevented, and the
compact is not carried out as the parties intended.
The question is unresolved whether the clause providing
for the charging of federal rights against a state's allocation
applies to all uses that might be asserted at any time in the
future or only to amounts being used or contemplated at the
time the compact was formed. Cases indicate that upon the
creation of a federal reservation, a sufficient amount of water
for the purposes of the reservation for both present and future
needs is also reserved. But, are the quantities required for
those needs to be determined from the point in time at which
the reservation was created or from a point when the water is
actually being applied to the reservation purposes? Are the
needs to be ever increasing or are they fixed upon the reservation's creation and by what was contemplated to be needed
at that time? When a court is faced with these questions and
the responsibility of making an apportionment, it would
seem more equitable to impose upon a state only the burden
of the amount of water contemplated at the time of the reservation's creation. This conclusion is based upon the fact
that charging federal rights against a state's allocation reduces
the water available for state development and use.
Charging all federal uses against the state in which the use
is made is workable as long as the state's allocation is sufficient to satisfy the federal reserved rights. If federal rights in
one state are too large, the question arises, "Where does the
additional water come from?" The sharing of the burden
would give uniform treatment to all reserved rights, but at
the expense of ignoring the express provisions of the compacts. Basin-wide sharing would further the purpose of interstate compacting, and no state would have to function in perpetual fear that it might lose all or most of its allocated water
because the government asserted dormant reserved rights.
Further discussion of basin-wide sharing follows later in this
Comment.
pact, any rights or powers of the United States of America, its agencies,
or instrumentalities, in and to the use of the waters of the Yellowstone
River Basin nor its capacity to acquire rights in and to the use of said waters,
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The failure of compacts to allocate water to satisfy federal
rights could be cured by a reformation or amendment. Some
compacts specifically provide for alteration or amendment by
unanimous consent of all parties to the compact. 6 This would
7
involve a process similar to the initial compact negotiations. 5
The voluntary modification of compacts would avoid long
legal battles and unsatisfactory court reformation.
V. EFFECT OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF
INTERSTATE COMPACTS ON RESERVED RIGHTS

The basis of authority for an interstate compact is found
in the compact clause of the United States Constitution.8
When a compact is approved by Congress, the compact becomes the law of each compacting state, and no state may
withdraw or modify the compact except when the compact
provides otherwise or with concurring action of other compacting states plus congressional approval. 59
The question arises whether Congress has in any way limited or compromised 6 the reserved water rights it would otherwise have had by approving an interstate compact.6 ' For
example, under the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact,
Wyoming is to receive fourteen percent of the water available
for consumptive use in the Colorado River. 62 Assume the
United States claimed an amount of water for reserved rights
from the river for use in Wyoming equal to twenty percent of
the consumptive use. Is the United States bound by its ap56. See Snake River Compact, 64 Stat. 29 (1950).
57. Interstate compacts do represent more than a method of avoiding judicial apportionment. In forming a compact, states send delegates who represent each state's
interests. The states engage in a negotiation process analogous to those engaged
upon when corporations negotiate contracts or mergers. Compact negotiation is a
political process involving more than a matter of each state attempting to have the
interstate stream divided in a fair manner. Each state seeks to gain as much as possible from other states while giving up as little water and as few economic benefits
as possible. States enter into compacts and agree to terms and conditions which
they view as benefiting them, or at least, minimizing possible harm.
58. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
59. Bloom, The Effects of Interstate Water Quality Controls on Legal and Institutional
Water Allocation Mechanisms--Can the Environmental Protection Agency Amend
an Interstate Compact?, 22 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 917, 931 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Bloom ].
60. By "limited or compromised," what is meant is: (1) when the compact refers to
federal water rights, the governments right to water under the reserved rights doctrine is the amount of water actually being used at the time of the consent or (2)
when the compact is silent on federal water rights, the federal government has no
rights under the reserved rights doctrine.
61. See Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study of
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
62. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 1948, art. II, 63 Stat. 31.
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proval of the compact not to look to other states for satisfaction of the reserved rights in excess of that fourteen percent?6 If Congress is not bound by its consent, Wyoming
would receive a greater portion of the river than it is entitled
to under the compact terms. Conversely, if the water were
used for reservations outside Wyoming, the state would be
deprived of the allocation it had bargained for. No definite
answers are available, as neither the courts nor the compacts
have addressed this issue. The language of the compacts, however, lend support to an argument that the United States is
not bound by the allocations made by the compacts and could
assert its reserved rights against the allocations of other
states."
A number of cases concerning congressional consent to
compacts have arisen in other contexts. By analogy to these
decisions, there is some guidance as to how the problem might
be resolved. The earlier cases dealt primarily with the situation in which Congress had given its consent to a compact and
attempted to revoke or alter the consent by enacting inconsistant legislation. These cases took the position Congress had
merely given temporary approval to the interstate compact
subject to continuing congressional power to revoke or modify
its consent whenever Congress believed national legislation
should supercede the compact provisions." In 1855, the Supreme Court held Congress possessed the power to enact legislation inconsistent with previously approved compacts.A
The Court's decision was based on the proposition that one
session of Congress cannot impair the legislative power of
subsequent ones.6 7 In dictum, the Court of Appeals in Tobin
v. United States"8 rejected the argument that an explicit reservation by Congress to alter or repeal its consent was unconstitutional.
Based on these cases, it can be argued Congress has not
limited or compromised the United States' claims to reserved
water rights merely by giving consent to an interstate com63.
64.

In the Pyramid Lake controversy, United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534 (1973),
the Supreme Court seemed to believe the possibility of a real conflict of this nature
to be very remote.
See Yellowstone River Compact, art. XVI, 65 Stat. 663, 670 (1951); Upper Colo-

rado River Basin Compact, art. XIX, 63 Stat. 31, 42 (1949).
65.
66.
67.
68.

Bloom, supra note 59, at 932.
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 433 (1855).
Id.
306 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962).
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pact. Even if Congress were found to have limited or compromised the government's claims, if Congress can legislate in a
fashion incompatible with an approved compact, it would
seem it can also revoke or amend the legislative consent as
changed conditions may warrant. This position is consistent
with the basic purpose of the compact clause of the Constitution, i.e., to protect and promote the national interest in connection with interstate undertakings. The purpose of the
clause makes it necessary for Congress to retain its flexibility
69
to reconsider previously granted consent.
Conversely, it can be argued Congress has limited or compromised the government's rights to water by the failure to
make express provision for reserved water rights in its consent to the compact. The argument is developed in this manner: Once Congress has given consent, it has agreed the subject matter of the compact is to be governed by the interstate
mechanism. There is no right in Congress to modify or withdraw its approval except upon invitation by the compacting
states. The congressional consent to the interstate compact is
a contract between Congress and the compacting states. This
"contract" delineates the parties' respective rights and entitles
the states to rely upon local governmental mechanisms to
deal with the compact subject matter free from assertions of
federal rights contrary to the express terms of the compact.70
Two early Supreme Court Decisions" held that, when
Congress approves interstate compacts fixing state boundaries,
Congress is precluded from subsequently revoking or altering
that consent. Compacts concerning interstate rivers and
streams, on the other hand, fix the amount of water the respective states are to receive. By analogy, Congress should
not be allowed to alter those allocations in order to acquire
water under the reserved rights doctrine.
In connection with the above, a compelling argument can
be made that Congress has limited the rights the government
might otherwise have had by giving its consent to a compact
and failing to provide for its reserved rights. If Congress fails
69. INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS, supra note 31, at 290.
70.
71.

Bloom, supra note 59, at 932.
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 725 (1838); Poole v. Fleeger's

Lessee, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 209 (1837).
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to protect governmental interests at the time consent to a
compact is sought, government rights are limited to that extent. 72 This argument is based on the importance of an interstate compact and the great reliance, in terms of individual
actions and financial investments, on rights allocated by the
compact.
The argument has been presented that congressional consent is more than a mere revocable consent for compacting
states to act in a given manner until Congress acts inconsistently. 73 Long series of federal acts which rely on compacts
have been enacted for the purpose of enabling states to develop the water received under the interstate allocations. Congress granted each state the right to develop its waters free
from federal interference and hinderance. The congressional
consent was a limitation or compromise of the government's
claim to water for satisfaction of reserved rights otherwise
Congress would be interfering with the development they had
authorized the states to engage upon."

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

There is no indication that federal reserved rights will be
curtailed or abolished in the near future. Accordingly, it is
necessary that steps be taken toward resolving the problems
created by reserved rights so states can function in this environment and water be developed to the fullest extent possible.
Reserved rights can be treated as a national, state or basinwide obligation. The most equitable method of dealing with
reserved rightseis to treat them as a national obligation. This
would require the government to buy the water needed for
federal and Indian reservations rather than invoking its powers
under the reserved rights doctrine. If voluntary sales agreements could not be reached, the power of eminent domain
could be exercised and the water rights condemned. In both
instances, the money would come from the national treasury
and those who had been using the water are compensated.
It should be noted however, Tobin v. United States, supra note 85, would be of aid
to the government's position because most compacts do reserve the power to alter
or amend the compact.
73. Bloom, supra note 59, at 937.
74. Id.
72.
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A federally-initiated program to establish quantity ceilings
for federal water rights could also be of value. Under this program, the United States would determine and itemize the
ceiling amounts of water to be claimed in each state for all
reservations--except Indian reservations. The government
would renounce all claims to a greater amount of water under
its reserved rights, in effect, abolishing reserved rights on federal lands other than Indian reservations. Any amount in excess of the ceiling would be acquired by purchase or exercise
of the power of eminent domain. The ceilings have the advantage of allowing states to deal more fairly with the division
of an interstate stream so each state actually receives the benefits it believes it is receiving under an interstate agreement.
However, there are several problems with regard to this federal program. Given the present attitude of the government
toward western water, one problem is the impracticality;
another is the cost involved. Also, the government could establish the ceiling limits at a point so great as to make the
program of no benefit to either the federal or state governments.
The surrender of federal rights in excess of a specified
amount would create special problems with regard to Indian
rights. Undoubtedly, the federal government can renounce
its reserved rights for its own federal reservations. However,
Indians have an interest akin to a property right in the water
they presently use and the amounts they have a right to use
in the future, and the government cannot renounce rights
that belong to another. The Indians could agree to renounce
their reserved rights in exchange for the governnent's promise
to purchase water whenever the need for additional water
arises. The Indians, however, would most likely be apprehensive of an agreement calling for the relinquishment of their
rights in return for a promise to act in a particular manner in
the future.
Achieving certainty with regard to reserved rights and interstate allocation may call for congressional action. Legislation may be one way to effectively deal with an interstate river basin in a manner that will protect all parties with an interhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss3/3
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est in the stream. 5 The advantage does exist of furthering
the national interest by protecting public lands and reservations by making certain sufficient water is available for use
on those lands. Congressional action has the disadvantage of
federal involvement in an area which states prefer to believe
within their control.
State and federal cooperation is also a desirable method
of resolving conflicts; cooperation protects state water users
yet allows the United States to acquire water needed for federal reservations purposes.76 Notwithstanding the power to
seize water used by junior appropriators, reserved rights should
not be blindly asserted until the effects on existing state water users, plans and projects can be observed. Often, the purchasing of water rights by the United States would be considerably less costly in terms of public relations and cooperation.
In addition, upon the creation of new reservations, Congress
should report to the state, at the time of the reservation's
creation, the water claimed in clear terms and definite quantities.
While treating reserved rights as a national obligation may
be preferable, at the present time, it seems the states will
have to deal with the demands of reserved rights. It should be
considered that although the general attitude toward reserved
rights has been that they are detrimental, they may, in fact,
be advantageous for a state. The state is assured of capturing
a certain quantity of water for use within the state. Also, it
must be assumed the Indians and the federal government will
apply the water to beneficial and productive use to the same
degree other water users would. Arguably, even though different users are producing and receiving the rewards of the
water, the net benefits to the state--and nation-are the same.
If the reserved rights are treated as an obligation of each
individual state, the allocation of the state in which the reserved rights exist will be charged with the amount required
to satisfy the demands. This imposes a burden on the state
that may not have been contemplated when the allocation
was made. This would be especially true with reserved rights
75.
76.

ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN WATER RESOURCE DIvELOPMENT 327
(Smith & Castle eds. 1964).
Id. at 333.
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for federal reservations, other than Indian reservations, because it was not until 19637 that reserved rights were known
to apply to all federal reservations. Placing the burden on just
one state seems to unfairly benefit other states in the river
basin and deprives the burden-bearing state of the benefits of
its agreement. However, it may be desirable to require an individual state to bear the reserved rights when the quantity
required is extremely small. The administrative convenience
outweighs any hardship the state might experience, and it is
doubtful a small amount would affect junior appropriators
except in years of extreme shortage.
The inventory and quantification of reserved rights would
be the most popular and practicable way to prevent future
and to cure some of the problems posed by these enigmatic
rights. States need to take greater advantage of the McCarren
Amendment, 78 Eagle County79 and Colorado River Water
Conservancy District8 to identify and quantify reserved water rights so junior appropriators who are and have been applying the water to beneficial use can be protected. The need
to have full and precise knowledge of Indian and federal reserved rights will become even greater as the competition for
water increases.81 While preferable, this solution is not very
practical. The impracticality is demonstrated by the government's unwillingness to voluntarily consent to adjudication
of their water rights and the long legal battles involving the
adjudication of reserved rights.
A suggestion for dealing with reserved rights is to provide
in the interstate compact that each state bears the burden of
the reserved rights within the state-but with a limitation on
the total quantity. In this way, a state bears the burden of
satisfying reserved rights up to a certain specified amount.
When the federal demands exceed this amount, the obligation
becomes one of the river basin as a whole, to be divided on a
pro rata basis equal to the portion of the stream flow received.
An arrangement such as this assures each compacting state
that it will not individually bear a burden beyond that agreed.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Arizona v. California, supra note 7.
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
United States v. Dist. Court in and for the County of Eagle, supra note 14.
Colorado River Water Conservancy Dist. v. United States, supra note 17.
Veeder, Indian Prior and ParamountRights to the Use of Water, supra note 10, at
662.
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A more equitable way to deal with the conflict is to distribute the entire burden among all states in the river basin.
The regional distribution is consistent with basin-wide development and protects one state from having to bear a burden
that was unprovided for when the allocation was made. The
burden of federal and Indian reserved rights would be divided
among the basin states by reducing each state's share of the
water in proportion to its allocation.
VII. CONCLUSION

In the area of reserved rights and interstate allocation of
water, there are many questions and problems, but no definite
answers. As federal water demands grow, competition between
states increases, and water becomes more scarce, uncertainty
created in state water rights and interstate allocations will become more significant, and the need to resolve the many unanswered questions will become more imminent. Action is
needed now to avoid problems created by reserved rights in
the context of interstate allocations so a "patchwork remedy"
approach will not be utilized and a long legal battle can be
avoided at a time when answers, action and water will be
more important.
CATHERINE L. DIRCK
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